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Abstract
Where should we look to understand the origin of inequality? I propose an unusual window
of evidence—modern societies. I hypothesize that evidence for the origin of inequality is
encoded in the institutional structure of industrial societies. To test this idea, I use a model to
project modern trends into the past. This model takes the modern relation between energy,
hierarchy, and inequality and creates a hindcast of the origin of inequality. The results are
broadly consistent with the available evidence. The model predicts an explosion of inequality
with the transition from hunter-gathering to agriculture, followed by a plateau. This finding
potentially opens a new window of evidence into the origin of inequality.
1 Introduction
The origin of inequality is one of the great mysteries of human social evolution. For the vast
majority of our history, we lived in small bands that were fiercely egalitarian [1]. But then
around 10,000 years ago, something changed [2, 3]. For reasons that remain poorly under-
stood, we began to abandon our ancestral state, and started allowing some individuals to com-
mand vastly more resources than others. At first inequality was the exception, but it soon
spread until it became the most common form of organization.
This great transition has puzzled scientists for centuries [2–11]. But like the origin of life, the
origin of inequality is frustratingly difficult to study. The problem is that origins remain locked
in the past, meaning evidence is sparse. Still, we have made progress. With great effort, we have
found three ‘windows’ of evidence into the origin of inequality: the archaeological record [10–
19], surviving traditional societies [20–25], and the written record of inequality [26–30].
These windows focus either on societies that are long gone, or societies whose form is
archaic. This is perfectly reasonable, but it also limits the evidence we can uncover. The archae-
ological and written record of inequality will always be sparse. And traditional societies are
rapidly disappearing from the world. Given the limits of these windows, where else might we
look to study the origin of inequality? I suggest we draw inspiration from evolutionary biology.
One of the great breakthroughs in studying the origin of life was the discovery that the
DNA of living organisms contains a coded history of their evolution [31]. Might something
similar be true of human societies? Might the social structure of modern societies contain a
coded history of the origin of inequality? I test this possibility here. I use institutions as the
social corollary of DNA. Institutions are systems of organizing that are passed between genera-
tions. I think we can use modern institutional trends to infer the origin of inequality.
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Looking at modern societies, I find two important trends (Section 2). First, societies that
use more energy tend to have larger institutions. Second, modern institutions are hierarchically
organized and income increases rapidly with rank. How does this relate to the origin of
inequality? The key is that the growth of institution size can be interpreted as the growth of
hierarchy. The idea is that as hierarchy grows it concentrates resources at the top, potentially
leading to greater inequality. The modern trend is towards greater energy use and greater hier-
archy. To infer the origin of inequality, I propose that we reverse this trend and project it back-
wards in time. I call this the ‘energy-hierarchy-inequality’ (EHI) hypothesis:
Energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis
We can infer the origin of inequality from the modern relation between energy use, hierarchy,
and inequality.
Like with DNA, these institutional trends do not give direct evidence of our past. Instead,
they must be interpreted with a model. To test the EHI hypothesis, I use a model to project
modern trends into the past (Section 3). The model gives a hindcast of the origin of inequality
—a prediction that can be compared to empirical evidence. The results are promising (Section
4). Consistent with the available evidence, the model predicts an explosion of inequality during
the energy transition from hunter-gathering to agriculture. As energy use increases beyond
agrarian levels, the model predicts that inequality should plateau. Whether this plateau is con-
sistent with evidence is less clear. Depending on the inequality metric used, there is evidence
that inequality declines slightly with industrialization. This may be because hierarchies become
less ‘despotic’ as energy use increases. Future research is needed to test this possibility.
The results suggest that institutional trends in modern societies provide a plausible window
into the origin of inequality. I speculate about causal mechanisms in Section 5, but for now the
evidence is too sparse to draw many conclusions. More importantly, this finding opens new
doors for future research. It implies that looking to the past may not be the only way to under-
stand the origin of inequality. Signs of humanity’s deep history may be encoded in the institu-
tional structure of our own societies.
2 Energy, hierarchy, and inequality: The evidence
I review here the evidence linking energy, hierarchy, and inequality. The chain of reasoning
(but not necessarily causation) is:
energy   ! institution size   ! hierarchy   ! power   ! income
I begin with energy because, like many scientists [32–41], I think social evolution is tied to
energy use. The rationale is simple: according to the laws of thermodynamics, a non-equilib-
rium system must be supported by a flow of energy [42]. Since human societies are non-equi-
librium systems, energy should play an important role in social evolution.
The link between energy and inequality has been proposed before [43–46], but this paper
makes two new contributions. First, I explicitly link energy and inequality through social hier-
archy. Second, I develop a formal model that hindcasts the origin of inequality.
2.1 Energy and institution size
The energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis begins with a link between energy and institution
size. In modern societies, institution size is strongly correlated with energy use per capita [47,
48]. Fig 1 illustrates this effect using business firms. Fig 1A plots average firm size within differ-
ent nations against their energy use per capita. Each point represents a country, with error
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bars indicating the uncertainty in average firm size. As energy use per capita increases, average
firm size increases as well.
The growth of average firm size is not caused by a horizontal shift in the distribution. Instead,
it is caused by a fattening of the distribution tail. Fig 1B visualizes this behavior. Here I group
the countries of the world into quintiles (5 groups) ranked by energy use per capita. For each
quintile, I plot the aggregate firm size distribution. Note how the slope of the firm size distribu-
tion decreases with greater energy use. This indicates that large firms become more common.
The firm size distribution can be modeled by a power law [48–51]. This means that the
probability of finding a firm of size x is roughly proportional to x−α, where α is the power-law
exponent. A smaller power-law exponent indicates a fatter tail. As shown in Fig 1B, greater
energy use is associated with a smaller power-law exponent for the firm size distribution. This
provides a simple way to model the relation between energy use and firm size.
2.2 Institution size and hierarchy
The second step of the energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis is to connect institution size to
hierarchy. I hypothesize that (virtually) all human institutions are hierarchically organized.
This means they have a nested chain of command that grows with institution size. As the hier-
archy grows, new ranks are added at a logarithmic rate [52, 53]. This scaling behavior has been
observed in business firms [54], historical empires [55], and hunter-gather societies [56]. Hier-
archical organization also means that elite ranks should become more common as a hierarchy
grows. Assuming that managers occupy top ranks, this implies that the management share of
employment should increase with average firm size. This trend has been observed at the inter-
national level [48].
The most direct evidence for hierarchical organization comes from firm case studies [57–
62]. Fig 2 shows the hierarchical structure of six case-study firms (which come from Britain,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States). Although the specific structure varies, all six
Fig 1. How firm size changes with energy use per capita. Panel A shows how average firm size within nations varies with energy use per
capita. Firm size is measured using employment. Each data point represents a country. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval in the
estimates of mean firm size. Grey regions indicate the 95% confidence region of the regression. Panel B shows how the entire firm size
distribution within nations varies by energy use. I put countries into 5 groups, ranked by energy use. I then plot the aggregate firm size
distribution within each group. The inset graph shows average energy use per capita within each quintile. Here α refers to the estimated power-
law exponent of the firm size distribution. For sources and methods, see Section 7.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g001
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firms share the pyramid shape that we expect of a hierarchy. I use these case studies to inform
the energy-hierarchy-inequality model (see Section 7 for details).
To summarize, the evidence suggests that institutions tend to become larger as energy use
increases. If institutions are hierarchically organized, this implies that the growth of energy is
associated with the growth of hierarchy.
2.3 Hierarchical power and income
The last component of the energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis is a relation between hierar-
chical power and income. The idea is that elites use their power within a hierarchy to gain pref-
erential access to resources.
Why might this be the case? Our evolutionary background provides some hints. Virtually
all social mammals form dominance hierarchies [63–68]. In these hierarchies, high social sta-
tus allows greater access to resources, particularly sexual mates [69–74]. Given our evolution-
ary heritage, we expect that humans should exhibit similar behavior. Unsurprisingly, there is a
strong link between human hierarchical status and reproductive success [75–79].
Is the same true for income? Evidence suggests so. But before looking at this evidence, I
note a key difference between human and non-human hierarchies. All other animals form lin-
ear hierarchies—an ordinal ranking from top to bottom. But humans form branching hierar-
chies, in which each superior controls multiple subordinates. This has important consequences
for income distribution. In a branching hierarchy, the number of subordinates grows exponen-
tially with rank (Fig 3). If income stems from power over subordinates, than it too should
increase exponentially with rank. This means that hierarchy can lead to vast inequalities.
To make this relation quantitative, I define ‘hierarchical power’ as:
hierarchical power ¼ 1þ number of subordinates ð1Þ
The idea is that control over subordinates is a form of power—it increases “the possibility
of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons” [80]. All individuals start with a
Fig 2. Hierarchical employment structure of six case-study firms. This figure shows the hierarchical employment structure of six different
case-study firms, named after the study authors [57–62].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g002
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baseline power of 1, indicating they have control over themselves. Hierarchical power then
increases proportionally with the number of subordinates.
Is income within hierarchies a function of hierarchical power? Evidence from case-study
firms suggests so. Fig 4 plots average income (relative to the bottom hierarchical level) against
average hierarchical power for each rank in our six case-study firms. There is a strong correlation.
A similar correlation exists between changes in income and changes in hierarchical power [81].
Fig 3. The exponential growth of subordinates with rank. In an idealized hierarchy, the total number of subordinates (blue) tends to grow
exponentially with hierarchical rank (red). The exact relation will depend on the span of control—the number of subordinates directly below
each superior.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g003
Fig 4. Average income vs. hierarchical power within case-study firms. This figure shows data from six firm case
studies [57–62]. The vertical axis shows average income within each hierarchical level of the firm (relative to the base
level), while the horizontal axis shows my metric for average power, which is equal to one plus the average number of
subordinates below a given hierarchical level. Each point represents a single firm-year observation, and color indicates
the particular case study. Grey regions around the regression indicate the 95% prediction interval. For methods, see
Section 7.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g004
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The power-income relation implies that inequality should increase as a hierarchy grows.
This is because hierarchical power gets concentrated as a hierarchy gets larger (Fig 5). Impor-
tantly, this relation is non-linear. The initial growth of hierarchy rapidly concentrates power.
But further growth of hierarchy leads to progressively slower growth of hierarchical-power
concentration. If income scales with hierarchical power, the same should be true of inequality.
As a hierarchy grows, inequality should explode and then plateau.
To summarize, modern evidence suggests a joint relation between energy use, hierarchy,
and inequality. As energy use increases, societies become more hierarchical. If income is pro-
portional to hierarchical power, this should cause an increase in income inequality. To investi-
gate the origin of inequality, I propose that we extrapolate this relation back in time.
3 An energy-hierarchy-inequality model
To extrapolate the energy-hierarchy-inequality evidence, I create a numerical model. This
model simulates the empirical relation between energy, hierarchy, and income. I discuss the
basic components of the model below. For a technical discussion, see Section 7.
3.1 Model assumptions
The energy-hierarchy-inequality model extrapolates modern trends into the distant past. To
do this, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. Institutions have a power-law size distribution. The growth of institution
size is synonymous with a decline in the power-law exponent.
Assumption 2. Institutions are hierarchically organized with a structure equivalent to mod-
ern firm hierarchies.
Fig 5. The growth of hierarchy concentrates power. This figure illustrates how the growth of hierarchy leads to the concentration of
hierarchical power. Below each hierarchy, I show the distribution of hierarchical power. (hierarchical power = 1 + the total number of
subordinates). I then calculate the Gini index of hierarchical power concentration (G). The initial growth of hierarchy rapidly concentrates
power. But further growth of hierarchy leads to progressively slower growth of hierarchical-power concentration.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g005
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Assumption 3. The modern trend between energy use per capita and institution size applies
to all societies.
Assumption 4. Income scales with hierarchical power in all societies. The rate of scaling may
vary over time and space.
Are these assumptions realistic? Regarding assumption 1, there is evidence that pre-capital-
ist societies had a power-law distribution of institution size. For instance, feudal manor size
was roughly power-law distributed [82, 83]. Similarly, slave estate size in the antebellum Amer-
ican South was roughly power-law distributed (see S1 Fig). Evidence also suggests that hunter-
gatherer settlement sizes had a power-law distribution tail [84]. The types of institution cer-
tainly vary across time and space. But regardless of type, the power-law distribution of institu-
tion size seems common.
Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 are speculative. But given empirical evidence, why not extrapolate it
and see where it takes us?
3.2 Model structure
The energy-hierarchy-inequality model has four main steps, discussed below. For technical
details, see Section 7.
Step 1: Generate the institution-size distribution. The model generates an institution size
distribution using a discrete power law. The power-law exponent varies stochastically over
different model iterations. This simulates changes in institution size.
Step 2: Estimate energy use from institution size. Energy use per capita (Epc) is modeled as a
function of average institution size �I :
Epc ¼ c1�I
c2 ð2Þ
The parameters c1 and c2 are determined from a regression on the international energy and
firm data shown in Fig 1A.
Step 3: Create hierarchical structure. The model uses firm case-study data (Fig 2) to deter-
mine the hierarchical structure of institutions. All modeled institutions have the same
‘shape’, but the number of ranks varies with institution size.
Step 4: Endow individuals with income Individual income I scales with hierarchical power P
as
I / Pb � � ð3Þ
where β determines the rate of scaling and � is a noise factor. To simulate variation between
societies, β varies stochastically between model iterations. I use case studies of modern
firms, as well as an antebellum US slave estate, to determine a plausible range for this varia-
tion. The noise factor � adds a small amount of dispersion to the power-income relation.
This is determined by income dispersion within hierarchical levels of the case-study firms.
On its own, the noise factor corresponds to a Gini index of about 0.1.
Between-Institution Income Dispersion. The model excludes income dispersion between
institutions. US evidence suggests that between-institution income dispersion accounts
for a minority of total income dispersion (about 30%) [85]. I assume that the growth of
between-institution dispersion is not important for the emergence of inequality. Future
research can determine if this is an appropriate assumption.
Energy, hierarchy and the origin of inequality
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3.3 Visualizing the energy-hierarchy-inequality model
Fig 6 visualizes the energy-hierarchy-inequality model as a landscape. Hierarchies appear as
pyramids, with hierarchical rank indicated by height and color. On top is a subsistence society
that consumes 5GJ of energy per capita per year. This is 3200 Kcal per day—not much above
the metabolic needs of an average person. Hierarchical organization is negligible. Conse-
quently, hierarchical power is very equally distributed, with a Gini index of 0.13. We expect
very little inequality in this society.
On the bottom is an industrial society that consumes 500GJ of energy per capita per year—
similar to modern Iceland or Qatar. Hierarchical organization is ubiquitous. Consequently,
Fig 6. Visualizing the energy-hierarchy-inequality model. This figure shows the EHI model as a landscape. Hierarchies are visualized as
pyramids. Height and color indicate hierarchical rank. The top panel shows a subsistence society that consumes hunter-gatherer levels of energy
use. The model predicts little hierarchical organization, and little concentration of hierarchical power. The bottom panel shows an industrial
society with energy use on par with modern Iceland or Qatar. The model predicts considerable hierarchical organization, and considerable
concentration of hierarchical power.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g006
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hierarchical power is extremely concentrated, with a Gini index of 0.76. We expect significant
inequality in this society.
4 Extrapolating the origin of inequality
I use the EHI model to extrapolate the origin of inequality. Fig 7 shows the predicted relation
between energy use, the concentration of hierarchical power, and inequality. There are four
notable predictions:
1. Hierarchy vanishes at metabolic levels of energy use, causing a collapse of inequality.
Hierarchical organization disappears as energy use approaches metabolic levels (i.e. food
energy only). Consequently, hierarchical-power concentration is eliminated and inequality
becomes negligible.
2. Inequality explodes during the transition to agriculture. Virtually all increases in inequal-
ity occur during the transition from subsistence to agrarian levels of energy use. (In Fig 7,
agrarian energy use is represented by Eastern Eurasia from 5,000 BCE to 1500 CE [86]).
3. The range of inequality grows with energy use. The transition to agriculture opens a huge
range of ‘inequality space’. The governing factor is β—the rate that income scales with hier-
archical power. Societies with low β remain equal during the transition to agriculture. But
societies with high β experience an explosion of inequality.
4. Energy growth beyond agrarian levels has little effect on inequality. After the transition
to agriculture, the concentration of hierarchical power plateaus. As a result, further
increases in energy use have a negligible effect on inequality.
4.1 Testing the energy-hierarchy-inequality prediction
The EHI model predicts how the emergence and evolution of inequality should relate to
energy use. Fig 8 compares this prediction to the available evidence.
Fig 8A compares the model to archaeological data for ancient societies. The caveat is that
the archaeological data measures inequality using house size [18]. This is not strictly compara-
ble to the ‘income inequality’ produced by the EHI model. Nonetheless I make a comparison.
The archaeological data is grouped by societal adaptation. Horizontal error bars indicate the
plausible range of energy use for each adaptation. Points represent the mean estimate. (For
sources and methods, see Section 7). The model’s prediction is consistent with the archaeolog-
ical evidence—inequality explodes during the transition to agriculture.
Fig 8B compares the model to data from pre-industrial societies [29]. Horizontal error
bars show the uncertainty in energy use (which is estimated from GDP). Again, the model is
consistent with the empirical data. In pre-industrial societies, inequality increases rapidly with
energy use.
Fig 8C compares the model to modern evidence. The model’s range is consistent with the
empirical data. But there is a downward trend in the empirical data that is not predicted by the
model. I discuss possible interpretations of this trend below. Fig 8D also compares the model
to modern evidence, but measures inequality using the top 1% income share. The empirical
data is in a range that is consistent with the model. Again, there is a downward trend in the
empirical data, but far less pronounced than in Fig 8C.
To summarize, EHI model predictions for the origin of inequality are consistent with the
available evidence. But for industrial societies, the model predictions are more ambiguous.
Modern evidence is within the range predicted by the model. However, the data shows a
decline of inequality with energy use that is not predicted.
Energy, hierarchy and the origin of inequality
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Fig 7. Extrapolating the origin of inequality with the EHI model. This figure shows the results of the energy-hierarchy-
inequality model. Panel A shows how the concentration of hierarchical power changes with energy use per capita. Panel B
shows the evolution of income inequality. Color indicates the scaling exponent β between hierarchical power and income
(see Eq 3). Shaded regions show the energy use range for various societies throughout history. For sources and methods,
see Section 7.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g007
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4.2 The Kuznets curve: The decline of hierarchical despotism?
Fig 9A aggregates all the empirical data in Fig 8A–8C to show the long-term trend between
energy use and inequality. A Kuznets curve-like pattern [87] emerges (an inverted U-shaped
relation). Inequality tends first to increase with energy use, and then decline. The increase is
predicted by the model, but the decrease is not. Is the model wrong?
More evidence is required to answer this question. The problem is that the model predicts a
huge range of ‘inequality space’ for industrial societies. The range of this space is determined
by β—the scaling of income with hierarchical rank. I have assumed that the distribution of β is
independent of energy use. But this could be wrong. To test the model, we need independent
estimates of β in real-world societies. Such estimates do not presently exist.
While we cannot confirm or falsify the model, we can infer how β should behave if the
model is correct. To do this, we match the empirical data to the best-fit model iteration. We
Fig 8. Testing the energy-hierarchy-inequality model. This figure compares the EHI model to empirical data. Panel A shows archaeological
data from ancient societies, measured using housing size and reported by ‘adaptation’. Horizontal lines indicate the plausible range of energy
use for each adaptation. Panel B shows income inequality in pre-industrial societies. Energy use is estimated from per capita income data
(horizontal lines show the uncertainty). Panel C shows data for modern nation-states, with vertical lines showing the range of inequality
estimates for each country. Panel D also shows modern data, but measures inequality using the top 1% income share. For sources and methods,
see Section 7.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g008
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then assign the model’s β to the real-world society. The resulting inference is shown in Fig 9B.
If the model is correct, β should decline with energy use.
Future research can test this inference. For now, I reflect on what it means. The parameter
β determines how rapidly income scales with hierarchical power. I interpret β as an index of
hierarchical despotism. It measures elites’ ability to use their hierarchical power to concentrate
resources. A larger β indicates a more despotic hierarchy (greater returns to hierarchical
power). The model predicts that hierarchical despotism declines as energy use increases.
This suggests that the Kuznets curve is created by two trends that accompany increases in
energy: (1) the growth of hierarchy; and (2) the decline of hierarchical despotism. The first half
of the Kuznets curve is created by the growth of hierarchy, which concentrates hierarchical
power, leading to greater inequality. But hierarchical power concentration eventually plateaus.
At this point, the decline in hierarchical despotism dominates the trend. This causes the sec-
ond half of the Kuznets curve—inequality declines with greater energy use.
The decline of hierarchical despotism is an untested inference. But it seems plausible. His-
tory suggests that as societies develop, they introduce checks on power. These include the rule
of law, democracy, and labor unions. Might these checks on power gradually reduce hierarchi-
cal despotism? Future research can test if this is true.
5 Discussion
The results of the model suggest that the energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis is plausible.
By projecting modern trends into the past, we can accurately predict the origin of inequality. I
discuss here some of the implications. I begin with the model’s limitations, and then speculate
about causation and the role of hierarchy in the emergence of inequality.
5.1 Model limitations
The energy-hierarchy-inequality model is built on correlation and is not intended to answer ques-
tions of causation. This is a limitation, but is also the main reason the model provides insight.
Fig 9. Is the Kuznets curve caused by declining hierarchical despotism? Panel A plots all of the empirical data in Fig 8A–8C. The red line
shows the smoothed trend. It has an inverted U shape, often called a ‘Kuznets curve’. Panel B shows inferred β for each society. This is the
scaling of income with hierarchical power that is required if the EHI model is correct. I infer β by matching real-world societies to the EHI
model. I interpret β as an index of ‘hierarchical despotism’—it measures elites’ ability to use their hierarchical power to concentrate resources.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g009
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The model takes two correlations as inputs: (1) the correlation between energy use and
institution size; and (2) the correlation between hierarchical power and income. The model
does not explain why these correlations exist. Instead, it explains why they might be important
for the origin of inequality. The model indicates that if these trends existed in the past, they
imply that inequality arose during the transition to agriculture.
Even though this operates at the level of correlation, it is an important insight. It suggests
that modern trends provide a new window into the origin of inequality. The task for future
research is to use this window to better understand the ultimate causes.
5.2 Causation
For the EHI hypothesis, understanding causation means explaining our two correlations. We
want to know why the growth of energy use relates to the growth of hierarchy, and why income
increases with hierarchical power. Answering these questions exceeds the scope of this paper.
But I will speculate here.
I suspect that energy relates to hierarchy via a feedback loop, meaning causation runs both
ways. I think this because different evidence suggests different causal directions. The collapse
of the Soviet Union is one example where hierarchy seems to drive energy use. When the Soviet
government collapsed, energy use in former Soviet states decreased dramatically [48]. Because
there was no global energy shortage at the time, we can plausibly infer that the institutional
collapse caused the decline in energy use.
But we can also think of reasons for the reverse causation—when energy drives (or limits)
the growth of hierarchy. This ties into the surplus theory of social stratification [88–90]. In
agrarian societies, the energy surplus of farmers is too small to support many non-farm work-
ers [34]. Thus, there is little room for a managerial class. But if the surplus grew, it could loosen
these limits and allow the growth of hierarchy [48, 91]. This suggests that energy growth could
cause the growth of hierarchy.
These two examples suggest that causation can run both ways—energy can drive the
growth of hierarchy and vice versa. Untangling this causal process is a difficult task for future
research.
What causes the relation between income and hierarchical power? I think it is likely caused
by many different factors. In despotic hierarchies (such as slave plantations), superiors may
use coercion and brute force to derive their income. But in less despotic hierarchies, ideology is
likely more important. The substance of these ideologies differs, but the function is always the
same—to justify the power of elites. Traditional societies often justify power through kinship—
tracing lineage to a founding ancestor [92, 93]. Feudal societies use religion, as in the divine
right of kings [94]. Capitalist societies use ownership to justify power [95]. In each society, the
ideology justifies both the authority of elites and their greater access to resources. To under-
stand why income relates to hierarchical power, I think we must understand the ideologies
that legitimize power. These ideologies have been well studied [95–111], but much remains to
be learned.
We must also take seriously the social practices that evolve to check the power of elites. In
modern societies, this would include labor unions and democratic oversight. There is strong
evidence that labor unions limit inequality [112, 113]. This suggests that by organizing low-
ranked individuals, unions check the power of elites. There is also evidence that democratic
oversight limits the income of elites. For instance, US CEOs in industries that are regulated by
government earn less than CEOs in non-regulated industries [114]. And elite compensation in
the democratically-controlled public sector is far lower than in the private sector. As one exam-
ple, the US president earns about 40 times less than CEOs in the largest US firms [115–117].
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While there are many plausible causes for the power-income relation, studying them brings
us back to the problem of measurement. I focused on hierarchical power because it was easy to
quantify. But when we try to look under the hood of this power, measurement becomes diffi-
cult. For instance, how do we measure the effect of an ideology? To understand causation, we
must wrestle with these difficulties. Again, this is a task for future research.
5.3 The emergence of hierarchy
Although we poorly understand the mechanisms at work, I want to speculate about the origin
story told by the EHI model. It suggests that the origin of inequality can be reframed as the
emergence of hierarchy. But this raises a question. After hundreds of thousands of years of liv-
ing in (relatively) egalitarian societies, why would humans suddenly choose to organize in des-
potic hierarchies?
Scientists have long puzzled over this question. Was there an advantage to hierarchy, as
functionalist theory contends [118, 119]? Or was it a matter of coercion, as conflict theory con-
tends [102, 120–122]? Or did the emergence of hierarchy involve both function and coercion
[101, 123–125]? I think the latter is most likely. Without a functional advantage, it is hard to
understand why hierarchy would emerge. But without coercion, it is hard to understand the
great inequalities that exist within hierarchies.
Let’s begin with the advantages of hierarchy. The modern evidence indicates that hierarchy
increases with energy use. One interpretation is that hierarchy somehow enables, or is neces-
sary for, greater energy use (for a different interpretation, see [91]). If this is true, then we need
to ask two questions. First, why is using more energy advantageous? Second, why is hierarchy
required to use more energy?
Regarding the first question, if life is the struggle for energy [35, 126], then using more
energy may give a competitive advantage to an organism (or group of organisms). This is the
idea behind the maximum power principle, which attempts to give an energetic basis to Dar-
winian fitness [127–129]. It proposes that organisms (and ecosystems) evolve to maximize
power—the flow of energy per unit of time. While it has some empirical support [130, 131],
the maximum power principle remains controversial.
Still, there are clear instances where using more energy is advantageous to human groups.
The most conspicuous is warfare. The evolution of military armament moves towards increas-
ingly devastating weaponry (bows and arrows, guns, missiles, and nuclear warheads). This
reduces to energetics: the destructive capability of a weapon is proportional to the amount of
energy it releases. We need only look at the history of European conquests to see how better
armament led to a group advantage [132]. Greater energy use may also allow reproductive
benefits. For instance, in existing traditional societies, agrarian societies tend to have higher
fertility than hunter-gatherers and horticulturists [133]. To summarize, using more energy
may be advantageous in inter-group competition. We can think of this as a form of ‘group
selection’ [134, 135]. The idea is that groups that use more energy outcompete groups that use
less energy.
But why is greater energy use associated with greater hierarchy? One possibility is that using
more energy requires greater social coordination, and hierarchy is the most potent way to
achieve this. Here is my reasoning. Increasing energy use involves profound technological
changes. Most notably, the scale and complexity of technology increases [48]. I suggest that
this increasing complexity requires more social coordination. This is where hierarchy comes
in. While humans can organize without hierarchy, the scale appears limited. The problem is
that human sociability likely has biological limits [136]. Individuals generally cannot maintain
more than a few hundred social relations. Hierarchy sidesteps these limits [55]. A member of a
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hierarchy needs to interact only with his direct superior and direct subordinates. This allows
group size to grow without the need for more social interactions.
If hierarchy confers energetic benefits (via coordination), we can imagine a feedback loop
emerging: Hierarchical organization enables large-scale coordination that then enables greater
energy use, that then enables more hierarchy (and so on). This explains why energy and hierar-
chy go together. But it leads to a problem. For the vast majority of human history, hierarchical
organization was negligible. Clearly there was no energy-hierarchy feedback loop. What are
we missing?
The missing ingredient is resource distribution within the hierarchy. The problem is that
hierarchy is a double-edged sword. It allows greater coordination, but it also leads to despo-
tism. The nested chain of command gives enormous power to top-ranked individuals. When
this power is (predictably) used for personal gain, it leads to vast inequalities. This would
explain why income scales with hierarchical power. The resulting inequality means that hierar-
chy may not benefit low-ranking individuals. If the material gains from coordination are
monopolized by elites, low-ranking individuals may be better off leaving the hierarchy. The
stability of a hierarchy thus depends on the net advantage for low-ranking individuals [125]. If
there is no advantage, the hierarchy will be unstable.
For the majority of human history, the costs of hierarchical despotism likely outweighed
any coordination benefits from hierarchy. We know that modern hunter-gatherers (and pre-
sumably ancient ones as well) aggressively suppress individuals with power-seeking tendencies
[137, 138]. Without a concentrated energy source (such as agriculture) the benefits to large-
scale coordination were likely marginal. Therefore, hierarchy was not tolerated because it con-
ferred no advantage.
This likely changed during the Neolithic revolution. The details remain poorly understood,
but we can guess that the benefits of large-scale coordination increased. This is likely related
to sedentism and the development of agriculture [139, 140]. Irrigation likely also played an
important role [141, 142]. I argue that during the Neolithic revolution, the energy-hierarchy
feedback loop took hold. As a result, hierarchical power became more concentrated. Elites pre-
dictably used their power for personal gain, resulting in the emergence of inequality.
I have so far treated inequality as an effect of hierarchy. But it may actually play a role in the
growth of hierarchy. I have argued that the growth of hierarchy depends on the net advantage
to low-ranking individuals. One way to increase this advantage is to increase the returns to
hierarchical coordination (through environmental or technological change). But another way
to increase the net advantage is to decrease hierarchical despotism. If the gains of hierarchy are
more equally distributed, the net benefit to low-ranking members is greater.
This reasoning means that inequality may play a causal role in the growth of hierarchy and
the growth of energy use. This is speculation, but it fits with the inference that hierarchical des-
potism declines with energy use (Fig 9B). Perhaps limiting hierarchical despotism is a prereq-
uisite for industrialization? Or put another way, is it possible to have an industrial economy
built on slavery—the most despotic mode of human organization? These are open questions
worth investigating.
To summarize, I think that understanding the energy-hierarchy-inequality relation requires
merging both functional and conflict theories of social stratification. It requires understanding
what Wilson calls the “fundamental problem of social life” [134]. The idea is that cooperative
groups beat uncooperative groups. But selfish individuals beat unselfish individuals within
groups. Hierarchy nicely highlights both aspects of this problem. It is a powerful tool for coor-
dination, and thus has potential group benefits. But it is also predictably used for selfish gain,
thus resulting in great inequality. Thinking in this way may provide an important tool for
understanding the origin of inequality.
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6 Conclusions
Origin questions are some of the most seductive in science. At the same time, they are among
the most difficult questions to answer. The problem is that origins are always locked in the
past, meaning evidence is frustratingly sparse. Scientific progress on origin questions happens
when we find reliable windows into the past.
It is instructive to see how new windows of evidence have advanced other fields. In modern
cosmology, the breakthrough came when Edwin Hubble discovered that galaxies are receding
from us. Reversing this trend implied that the universe had once been smaller—perhaps infi-
nitely so. And so the big bang theory was born [143]. In biology, the breakthrough came with
the discovery of DNA. By comparing the DNA of different organisms, we can infer the history
of evolution. It suggests that all life has a single origin [31].
What about the origin of inequality? Obviously we should continue to gather historical and
archaeological evidence. But this evidence will always remain limited. We should also continue
studying traditional societies. But these societies are rapidly disappearing from the world. That
leaves modern societies as a source of evidence.
I have proposed that the institutional structure of modern societies contains a coded history
of the origin of inequality. To test this idea, I used a model to project into the past the modern
relation between energy use, hierarchy, and inequality. The model predictions are generally
consistent with the evidence. This suggests we may have found a new window into the origin
of inequality.
7 Methods
7.1 Data sources and methods
Sources for Fig 1. Data for firm size comes from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM), series ‘omnowjob’. To calculate firm size, I merge all data over the years 2001-2014.
Because the GEM data over-represents large firms, I use only firms with 1000 or fewer employ-
ees. For method details, see the Appendix in Ref. [48]. Uncertainty in average firm size is esti-
mated using the bootstrap method. Firm size distribution power-law exponents are estimated
using the R PoweRlaw package [144]. Energy data comes from the World Bank, series EG.
USE.PCAP.KG.OE.
Sources for Figs 2 and 4. Firm case-study data comes from [57–62]. For a description of
this data, see the Appendix in Ref. [145]. Hierarchical power is defined as P = 1 + S, where P is
hierarchical power and S is the number of subordinates. Because the case studies provide data
for aggregate hierarchical structure only (not the chain of command), I calculate average hier-
archical power, �Ph ¼ 1þ �Sh. Here Sh is the average number of subordinates below level h. It is
defined as the sum of employment (E) in all subordinate levels, divided by employment in the
level in question: �Sh ¼
Ph  1
i¼1 Ei=Eh. Income is normalized relative to the average income in
the base hierarchical level (in the year in question).
Sources for Fig 7. I assume that human metabolic needs range from 2000 Kcal to 2500
Kcal per day. Western and Eastern Eurasia energy use data comes from Morris [86]. US total
energy consumption is from Historical Statistics of the United States, Tables Db164-171
(1900-1948) and Energy Information Agency Table 1.3 (1949-2000). US population is from
Maddison [146]. Qatar data comes from the World Bank (series EG.USE. PCAP.KG.OE).
Sources for Fig 8. Fig 8A. Archaeological inequality data is from Kohler et al. [18] and is
measured using house size. I estimate the energy use range for each adaptation using the data
in Table 1. Results for this energy range are shown in Fig 10. Fig 8B. Pre-industrial inequality
data is from Milanovic [29]. I estimate energy use from reported values of GDP per capita. To
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do this, I extrapolate the modern international relation between real GDP per capita and
energy use per capita. Data for this regression comes from the World Bank (series EG.USE.
PCAP.KG.OE and NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD). Fig 8C. Inequality data comes from three sources:
the World Inequality Database (Gini index calculated from Lorenz curves), the United Nations
World Income Inequality Database, and the OECD. I merge all data into a single database and
estimate the range of inequality from this data. Energy use data comes from the World Bank,
series EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE. Fig 8D. Top 1% income share data is from the World Inequality
Database. Energy use data is from the World Bank, series EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE.
Sources for Fig 9. Fig 9A. Merges all sources from Fig 8. Fig 9B. The hierarchical despo-
tism index β is estimated by matching empirical data to the best fit model iteration. β is chosen
by minimizing the following error function:
�i ¼ jlogEr   logEm;ij þ jGr   Gm;ij ð4Þ
Er and Gr are energy use per capita and the Gini index of inequality (respectively) in the real-
world society. Em,i and Gm,i are energy use per capita and the Gini index of inequality (respec-
tively) in the model iteration i. I assign real-world societies the model parameter βi associated
with the best-fit model iteration i.
7.2 Hierarchy model equations
This section provides technical details for the algorithm used to generate institutional hierar-
chies. Notation is shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Data sources for energy use by adaptation.
Society Energy (GJ/capita) Adaptation Source
Agrarian max 38 agriculture [86]
Bangladesh circa 1979 11.4 agriculture [147]
Catalonia 1860 34.6 agriculture [148]
Classical Greek 30.5 agriculture [86]
Classical Greek 38 agriculture [86]
Czechia 1850 39 agriculture [149]
England Wales 1560 20 agriculture [150]
England Wales 1600 17.4 agriculture [150]
Europe 1500 CE 30 agriculture [151]
Generic 26 agriculture [152]
Han China 41 agriculture [86]
Rome 9.2 agriculture [153]
Rome 16.8 agriculture [153]
Rome 38 agriculture [86]
Sang Saeng 48 agriculture [154]
Song China 45 agriculture [86]
Trinket Island 39 agriculture [155]
World 1820 19.2 agriculture [156]
Generic 12 horticulture [152]
Human-powered agriculture 9.5 horticulture [157]
Generic 3.8 hunting-gathering [157]
Generic 5 hunting-gathering [152]
Western Eurasia 10,000 BCE 7.6 hunting-gathering [86]
Western Eurasia 14,000 BCE 6.1 hunting-gathering [86]
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.t001
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7.2.1 Generating the employment hierarchy. To generate the hierarchical structure of an
institution, we begin by defining the span of control (s) as the ratio of employment (E) between
two consecutive hierarchical levels (h), where h = 1 is the bottom hierarchical level. It simplifies
later calculations if we define the span of control in level 1 as s = 1. This leads to the following
piecewise function:
sh �
1 if h ¼ 1
Eh
Eh  1





The model assumes that the span of control is not constant; rather it increases exponentially
with hierarchical level. I model the span of control as a function of hierarchical level (sh) with
Fig 10. Energy use estimates by adaptation. This figure shows the energy range for historical societies sorted by
adaptation. Data sources are shown in Table 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g010
Table 2. Hierarchy model notation.
Symbol Definition
a span of control parameter 1
b span of control parameter 2
E employment
h hierarchical level
n number of hierarchical levels in an institution
s span of control
T total for institution
# round down to nearest integer
∏ product of a sequence of numbers
∑ sum of a sequence of numbers
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.t002
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an exponential function, where a and b are free parameters:
sh ¼
1 if h ¼ 1
a � ebh if h � 2
(
ð6Þ
As one moves up the hierarchy, employment in each consecutive level (Eh) decreases by
1/sh. This yields Eq 7, a recursive method for calculating Eh. Since we want employment to be
whole numbers, we round down to the nearest integer (notated by #). By repeatedly substitut-
ing Eq 7 into itself, we can obtain a non-recursive formula (Eq 8). In product notation, Eq 8




for h > 1 ð7Þ
















Total employment in the whole institution (ET) is the sum of employment in all hierarchical
levels. Defining n as the total number of hierarchical levels, we get Eq 10, which in summation
notation, becomes Eq 11.





In practice, n is not known beforehand, so we define it using Eq 9. We progressively
increase h until we reach a level of zero employment. The highest level n will be the hierarchi-
cal level directly below the first hierarchical level with zero employment:
n ¼ fh j Eh � 1 and Ehþ1 ¼ 0g ð12Þ
To summarize, the hierarchical employment structure of our model institution is deter-
mined by 3 free parameters: the span of control parameters a and b, and base-level employ-
ment E1. Code for this hierarchy generation algorithm can be found in the C++ header files
hierarchy.h and exponents.h, located in the Supplementary Material [158].
7.2.2 Calculating hierarchical power in the hierarchy model. I define an individual’s
hierarchical power as one plus the number of subordinates (S) under their control:
P ¼ 1þ S ð13Þ
Because the hierarchy model simulates only the aggregate structure of institutions
(employment by hierarchical level), hierarchical power is calculated as an average per rank.
For hierarchical rank h, the average hierarchical power (�Ph) is defined as the average number
of subordinates (�Sh) plus 1:
�Ph ¼ 1þ �Sh ð14Þ
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Each individual with rank h is assigned the average power �Ph. The average number of
subordinates �Sh is equal to the sum of employment (E) in all subordinate levels, divided by







As an example, consider the hierarchy in Fig 11. The average number of subordinates








Therefore, these individuals would all be assigned a hierarchical power of 7.
7.3 Restricting model parameters
The model’s parameters are summarized in Table 3. My method for restricting these parame-
ters is detailed below.
Fig 11. Calculating the average number of subordinates.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g011
Table 3. Model parameters.
Parameter Definition Action Scope
α Institution size distribution
exponent
Determines the skewness of the institution size distribution —
a, b Span of control parameters Determines the shape of the institution hierarchy. Identical for all
institutions.
E1 Employment in base hierarchical
level
Used to build the employment hierarchy from the bottom up. Determines total
employment.
Specific to each firm.
β Power-income exponent Determines scaling relation between income and hierarchical power. Identical for all
institutions.
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7.3.1 Institution size distribution power-law exponent. Recent studies have found that
firm size distributions in the United States [49] and other G7 countries [51] can be modeled
accurately with a power law. A power law has the simple form shown in Eq 17, where the prob-





The hierarchy model assumes that all human societies have power-law institution size dis-
tributions. The model simulates different societies by allowing the power-law exponent α to
vary stochastically between different model iterations.
A characteristic property of power-law distributions is that as α approaches 2, the mean
becomes undefined. In the present context, this means that the model can produce institution
sizes that are extremely large—far beyond anything that exists in the real world. To deal with
this difficulty, I truncate the power-law distribution at a maximum institution size of 2.3 mil-
lion. This is the present size of Walmart, the largest firm that has ever existed.
Code for the discrete power-law random number generator can be found in the C++
header file rpld.h, located in the Supplementary Material [158]. This code is an adaptation
of Collin Gillespie’s [144] discrete power-law generator found in the R poweRlaw package
(which is, in turn, an adaptation of the algorithm outline by Clauset [159]).
7.3.2 Span of Control Parameters. The parameters a and b together determine the shape
of the model’s institutional hierarchies. These parameters are estimated from an exponential
regression on firm case-study data (Fig 12A). The model assumes that these parameters are
constant across all institutions. The resulting modeled hierarchy shape is shown in Fig 12B.
Because the case-study sample size is small, there is considerable uncertainty in the span of
control parameters. I incorporate this uncertainty into the model using the bootstrap method
[160], which involves repeatedly resampling the case-study data (with replacement) and then
estimating the parameters a and b from this resample. I run the model many times, each time
with a and b determined by a bootstrap resample of case-study data. The resulting variation in
the shape of the model’s hierarchies is indicated by the error bars in Fig 12B. Code implement-
ing this bootstrap can be found in the C++ header file boot_span.h located in the Supple-
mentary Material [158].
7.3.3 Base-level employment. Given span of control parameters a and b, each hierarchy
is constructed from the bottom hierarchical level up. Thus, we must know base level employ-
ment. To get this value, I input a range of different base employment values into Eqs 6, 9, and
11 and calculate total employment for each value. The result is a discrete mapping relating
base-level employment to total employment. I then use the C++ Armadillo interpolation func-
tion to linearly interpolate between these discrete values. This allows us to predict base level E1,
given total employment ET. Code implementing this method can be found in the C++ header
file base_fit.h, located in the Supplementary Material [158].







where Ih is income in hierarchical level h, I1 is income in the base hierarchical level, P is hierar-
chical power, and � is the stochastic noise factor.
To simulate variation between societies, I allow β to vary over different model iterations. I
use two different data sources to determine a plausible range for this variation. The first is
case-study data from modern firms [57–62]. I determine β from regressions on the data shown
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in Fig 4. For each case-study firm, I regress log(Ih/I1) onto logPh. The slope of the relation is
the estimate for β. I estimate the uncertainty in β using the bootstrap method [160]. I repeat-
edly resample case-study data and re-run the regression to estimate β. The resulting probability
distribution of β is shown in Fig 13A for each case-study firm.
Fig 12. Idealized hierarchy implied by firm case studies. Panel A shows how the span of control varies with hierarchical level in
case-study firms [57–62]. The span of control is the subordinate-to-superior ratio between adjacent hierarchical levels. The x-axis
corresponds to the upper hierarchical level in each corresponding ratio. Case-study firms are indicated by color. Horizontal ‘jitter’ has
been introduced to better visualize the data. The line indicates an exponential regression, with the grey region indicating the
regression 95% confidence interval. Panel B shows the idealized firm hierarchy that is implied by the regression in Panel A. Error bars
show the uncertainty in the hierarchical shape, calculated using a bootstrap resample of case-study data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g012
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The second data source is a case study of a US slave estate—Cannon’s Point Plantation
[161]. I estimate β from the living standard of the plantation owner relative to his slaves. For





Although we do not know the hierarchical structure of the slave estate, we know that the
owner sits on top of the hierarchy. All of the slaves are his subordinates. Therefore the number
of slaves (nslave) gives us a rough estimate for the owner’s hierarchical power:
Powner � 1þ nslave ð20Þ
If we know the living standard of the owner (Iowner) and slaves (Islave), we can combine Eqs 19





The living standard of the owner is equal to his income. But slaves have no income, so
we must use another method to estimate their living standards. One way is to use the slave
expenses paid by the owner. Another method is to compare the owner and slaves in terms
of house size. The results for both methods are shown in Fig 13B. Again, I use the bootstrap
technique to investigate the plausible range of β that is implied by the Cannon’s Point data. I
sample different values for the owner’s income, the slaves’ income (living standard), and the
number of slaves and put them repeatedly into Eq 21.
As we would expect, the resulting β for our slave estate is far higher than in our case-study
firms. In a slave regime, the evidence suggests that β could approach 1. To put this in perspec-
tive, this means income scales linearly with hierarchical power. If this were the case in indus-
trial societies, the CEO of Walmart would earn 2 million times that of an entry-level worker.
Nothing like this exists in industrial societies—for good reason. They are not based on slavery.
But slavery was ubiquitous in human history, so we need to allow for its existence in our
model.
Based on the case-study data in Fig 13, I allow β to vary over the range 0.2� β� 1.
7.3.5 Power-income noise factor. Noise (�) in the power-income relation is modeled
with a lognormal random variate with dispersion determined by the parameter σ:
� � lnN ðsÞ ð22Þ
The noise factor reproduces the average within-hierarchical level income dispersion in case-
study firms [57–62]. The distribution of within-hierarchical level income dispersion is shown
in Fig 14. To determine σ, we first calculate the mean Gini index (�G) of the case-study data
shown in Fig 14. We then calculate σ using:
s ¼ 2 � erf   1ð�GÞ ð23Þ
This equation is derived from the definition of the Gini index of a lognormal distribu-
tion: G = erf(σ/2). To incorporate uncertainty in the case-study data, each model iteration
uses a different bootstrap resample to calculate �G. Code implementing this method can
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be found in the C++ header file boot_sigma.h, located in the Supplementary Material
[158].
7.3.6 Estimating energy use from average institution size. The energy-hierarchy-
inequality model assumes that energy use Epc is proportional to average institution size I:
Epc ¼ c1�I
c2 ð24Þ
The parameters c1 and c2 are determined from regressions on the international firm data
shown in Fig 1A.
Fig 13. Probability distribution of β in case-study institutions. This figure shows the probability distribution of the parameter β in
different case-study institutions. This parameter indicates the scaling behavior between income and hierarchical power: income/
(hierarchical power)β. Probabilities are determined using the bootstrap method. Panel A shows the β probability distribution for case-
study firms [57–62]. Panel B shows the β probability distribution for a US slave estate (Cannon’s Point Plantation [161]). I show
results for measuring inequality in terms of both house size and income.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215692.g013
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Supporting information
S1 Fig. Distribution of slave ownership in the US South in 1860. The blue line shows the dis-
tribution of slave ownership in the US South. ‘Steps’ indicate the bins in the original data. The
red line shows the best-fit power-law distribution, which has an exponent α = 2.7. The shaded
region indicates the range of uncertainty for a sample of 1 million. Slave-estate size roughly fol-
lows a power-law distribution. Data is from [163], as reported in [164]. The best-fit power law
is determined using the methods in [165].
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